A scheme for controlled islanding to prevent subsequent blackout by Ahmed, S.S. et al.
136 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 18, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2003
A Scheme for Controlled Islanding to Prevent
Subsequent Blackout
S. Shahnawaz Ahmed, Senior Member, IEEE, Narayan Chandra Sarker, Member, IEEE, Azhar B Khairuddin,
Mohd Ruddin B Abd Ghani, Member, IEEE, and Hussein Ahmad, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The power systems operated by the utilities in de-
veloping countries suffer from a large gap between demand and
generation, inadequate transmission capacity, and nonuniform lo-
cation of the load centers and generating stations. Occurrences of
faults in such systems, in most of the cases, end up with the worst
consequences (i.e., complete blackout). This paper illustrates the
way a blackout can be prevented in real time through controlled
segregation of a system into a number of viable islands together
with generation and/or load shedding. The nature and location
of any fault that warrants such islanding can be ascertained in
real time through monitoring the active-power (megawatt) flows at
both ends of a number of prespecified lines. The blackout of June
20, 1998 in the Bangladesh Power Development Board system has
been used as an example in the illustration. The philosophy of the
proposed islanding scheme may be considered for implementation
in other power systems also.
Index Terms—Power system control, power system modeling,
power system protection, power system security, SCADA system.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE POWER SYSTEM owned by Bangladesh Power De-velopment Board (BPDB), the sole public utility for gen-
eration and transmission in Bangladesh, has evolved to a vul-
nerable position. The main reason is lack of funds for timely
rehabilitation of the existing generation plants and transmission
lines, and installation of new ones to meet a demand that in-
creases every year by approximately 10%. Also, unavoidable
concentration of the majority of powerstations in the country’s
eastern part, where indigenous gas and hydro reserves are lo-
cated, has contributed to the vulnerability of this system. The
consequent problems facing the operation of the BPDB system
are drastic load shedding, lack of spinning reserve, low-voltage
profile, and frequent [1] disruptions varying from wide-area out-
ages to total blackouts. The most recent blackout in the BPDB
grid system occurred on June 20, 1998. Such blackouts, need-
less to say, add to the inconveniences to consumers and cause
irreparable loss to the national economy over and above what
is caused by daily load shedding. Until now, no method has
been devised by BPDB to avert these blackouts. If its system
collapses for a fault, the generating units are restored one by
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one and synchronized with each other, taking almost a full day
between the occurrence of the grid failure and the restoration
of a sizable part. Also, considerable expenses are incurred in
restoring the power plants from stalled conditions.
Incidents of several blackouts in grid systems of a number of
developed countries have been reported in the literature [2]–[6].
The remedial measures suggested comprise generation shed,
load shed, and islanding. It appears that splitting a grid system
into a number of independent islands can be considered either as
a last resort [2] or as a primary measure [5] depending upon the
structure of the system. The basis for islanding is never unique
but rather depends upon the utility in particular. In some sys-
tems [4], postfault oscillations of the generators are identified
for their grouping before forming the boundaries of the islands
against a specific fault.
However, for a more vulnerable system like the BPDB grid,
an easy-to-implement and affordable method needs to be de-
veloped for islanding. The present paper proposes an islanding
scheme with a focus on the following aspects:
i) investigation into the viability of post fault islanding at
prespecified buses and lines of a grid system;
ii) determination of the criteria based on which the decision
for islanding can be taken in real time and determination
of the number of islands in order to avert blackout;
iii) supplementation of islanding by generation/load shed
ding, subject to the nature and location of the fault.
The above aspects have been illustrated by analyzing the
blackout of June 20, 1998, plus a few additional fault scenarios
in the BPDB grid system.
II. BLACKOUT OF JUNE 20, 1998 IN BPDB POWER SYSTEM
The BPDB grid is comprised of 24 power stations connected
primarily by a network of 132-kV transmission lines plus a few
230-kV lines. The grid area consists of two geographical zones:
East and West, interconnected by a 230-kV double circuit line
between GRSL—23 and ISHR—23 buses as shown in Fig. 1.
The generated electricity is distributed to approximately four
million consumers of various categories by BPDB itself, Dhaka
Electric Supply Authority (DESA), and Rural Electrification
Board (REB).
A. Blackout
On June 20, 1998 at 19:00 h (i.e., during the peak opera-
tion period) a total of 24 machines (some units within the same
power station are considered as a single lumped machine) were
generating 1970.5 MW to cater to a demand of 1918 MW, while
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Fig. 1. Single line diagram of BPDB grid system.
another 171-MW demand could not be supplied at that moment.
A total of 472 MW of generation capacity at different power sta-
tions was not available at that time primarily due to some units
being out of service for maintenance.
The start of the blackout event on June 20, 1998 was
marked at 19:10 h when both circuits of the 230-kV East-West
Inter-connector (EWI) tripped while transmitting approxi-
mately 226 MW to the West zone. This tripping was followed
by cascade outages of all the generators and tripping of a
number of lines in the grid system. It was not known exactly
where, when, and why the fault originated because no digital
fault recorders were installed in the BPDB grid system. There-
fore, to be aware of the events, information had to be collected
from internal documentation such as the field reports and log
sheets maintained in the load dispatch center (LDC), different
power stations, and grid substations.
B. Restoration
The restoration process was started at 19:29 h, followed by
another failure at 21:48 h. However, the process was finished at
06:38 h on June 21, 1998 (i.e., 11 h and 28 min after the oc-
currence of the blackout). But the generation for the day peak
(10:00 h) and the evening peak (19:00 h) on June 21, 1998 was,
respectively, 1604.7 and 1740.7 MW, which was less than the
generation at the corresponding instants on June 20, 1998 be-
fore the blackout incident. It is obvious that a coordinated and
prompt restoration is very difficult-to-achieve in a grid like the
BPDB system, once it experiences a fault with no attempt to
confine the effect within the fault’s place of origin and the im-
mediate surrounding area.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Upon occurrence of a fault on a line or at a bus in any part of a
grid system, the balance between the mechanical power input to
and the electrical power output from the synchronous generators
is affected. As a result, the rotors of various machines oscillate
noncoherently relative to each other, and they attempt to settle
to a new stable equilibrium position. If they fail, the rotor angles
continue to vary indefinitely from each other. Then the output
frequencies of the machines, the power flows in the lines, and
the voltages at the buses are subjected to nondiminishing swings
resulting in cascaded outages in the system, which is the mani-
festation of the blackout phenomenon. A detailed analysis of the
rotor swing angles, machines’ frequencies, line flows, and bus
voltages at the occurrence of the fault and after removing the
same is typically done solving alternatively a set of algebraic
equations and a set of second-order differential equations (e.g.,
by using a traditional transient stability program).
A multiport representation [7] shown in Fig. 2 for a power
grid comprises a total of buses in addition to the ground bus
(0). The generator-connected buses are assigned the first se-
rial numbers among buses ( ) . Each generator has
been represented [7], [8] as an emf source (having a constant
magnitude but a time-varying phase angle ) in series with
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Fig. 2. Multiport representation of an n-bus power system with synchronous
machines connected at the first m buses.
the respective direct axis transient reactance ( ) between the
generator’s internal bus ( 1 2 3 ) and
the system bus ( ) . Also, the internal
emf phase angle is considered [7], [8] to be the same as the
angle of the corresponding generator’s mechanical rotation. The
given active and reactive load ( ) at any bus
is converted into a constant shunt admittance and added
with the corresponding diagonal term of the system bus
admittance matrix . The generators’ direct axis admit-
tances ( ) are added with the first diagonal terms of
the matrix. As a result, the matrix becomes an
augmented matrix of the same size but with some of the
diagonal terms changed.
The bus voltage at any -th bus is obtained from
the solution of the bus voltage vector as follows:
(1)
The vector comprises the current elements such that
(2)
for (i.e., generator-connected buses).
(3)
for (i.e., nongenerator buses).
The electrical power output of each synchronous machine
connected at the buses is given by
(4)
The motion of the rotor of each synchronous machine at
( is the instant of fault occurrence) is governed [7], [8] by
the swing equation. Assuming negligible damping power this
equation can be written as follows:
(5)
where
inertia constant of -th machine in per unit of system
base MVA;
system frequency in prefault condition;
accelerating or decelerating power for -th machine;
mechanical power input to the -th machine and con-
sidered to be equal to its output in the prefault condi-
tion neglecting losses.
From the time of fault occurrence ( ) to the time prior
to fault clearance ( ) i.e., for , the admittance
matrix in (1) is of dimension . The
quantity denotes the number of buses to be excluded because
the fault occurs either at these buses or on the transmission lines
near these buses.
From the instant of fault clearing ( ) and thereafter (i.e.,
for ), the admittance matrix in (1) is of its original
dimension (i.e., ). Its diagonal terms corresponding to any
bus are recalculated if some generation/load is switched (shed
or added) at that bus at so that changes as follows:
(6)
where
prefault magnitude of the -th bus voltage;
, if some active load is shed;
, if some active generation is shed or load is
added;
,
if some inductive load is shed;
, if some reactive generation is shed or induc-
tive load is added;
,
if net reactive load at -th bus is to be made
capacitive.
Also for , the concerned diagonal and offdiagonal el-
ements of the bus admittance matrix of (1) are recom-
puted appropriately to take into account the effect of the lines
being either tripped for clearing the fault or removed for di-
viding the system into islands.
The constant emf magnitude , initial phase angle , and
prefault power output for each generator are obtained from
a load-flow solution [9] for the whole system in the prefault
condition (i.e., at 0 ).
Equation (5) is solved at a small interval of time for the
swing angle and frequency of each machine using the
step-by-step method [10] after computing for all the ma-
chines using (4) and voltages at the various buses of the grid
network using (1). For any instant of time [i.e., the
-th interval ( set limit)] the current vector
is formed using (2) and (3). The voltage vector
is obtained from (1) using the appropriate matrix corre-
sponding to or .
IV. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
The mathematical model presented in Section III has been
computer coded using FORTRAN 77. This is because commer-
cial programs available are not in editable form (i.e., no source
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TABLE I
PREFAULT BREAKUP OF GENERATION AND LOAD IN VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE BPDB GRID SYSTEM AT 19:00 HRS ON 20TH JUNE 1998.
code provided), and hence, cannot be customized to the spe-
cific input-output requirements of the present study such as in-
formation on islanding, load/generation switching, voltage, and
line-flow profiles, etc. The coded program has been compiled
and executed using Microsoft FORTRAN Power Station ver-
sion 1.0 on a 225-MHz Pentium PC under a Windows 95 oper-
ating system. The obtained swing angles, voltages, line power
flows, etc. have been retrieved from the output data files for con-
structing plots by the Microsoft Excel package.
The computer simulations have been made faster with less
memory requirements by exploiting [11] sparse structures of the
Jacobian matrices, and the augmented matrix. Jacobian
matrices are used in the prefault load-flow analysis.
The stability study is preceded by a prefault load-flow solu-
tion of the BPDB system under the operating conditions existent
at 19:00 h of June 20, 1998. The studied fault is considered to
be occurring at and cleared in four cycles (i.e., s
on 50-Hz basis). The step size used in the study is s
while the time span is from to s, which is usually
[7], [8], [10] enough to confirm whether the rotor oscillations of
various machines will settle or not. The results of the compre-
hensive study are presented, in the limited space of this paper,
mainly in the form of general comments while highlighting the
representative output data and plots.
A. Prespecification of Island Boundaries
As mentioned in section I, the present work has considered
prespecifying the boundaries of the islands. This has been done
on the basis of geographical proximity of the synchronous gen-
erators of the system, because the machines in the same geo-
graphical section oscillate coherently [12] when a fault occurs
in the system. Depending upon the location and severity of a
fault, the BPDB system can be divided into two to five com-
pletely separate islands. These islands are formed by five geo-
graphical sections—three of which are in the East zone and the
remaining two are in the West zone, as shown in Table I. Island
formation requires tripping the transmission lines existing be-
tween the sections. For reference, Table I also furnishes a sec-
tion-wise breakup of the generation and load just prior to the
blackout (i.e., at 19:00 h on June 20, 1998).
B. Stability Analysis for the Blackout Event
The blackout at 19:10 h of June 20, 1998 was simulated con-
sidering a three-phase fault on the EWI near its sending end bus
GRSL—23.
Fig. 3. Swings of some machines in island-1 (comprised by the East zone)
relative to RAUJ1210 machine for the case of June 20, 1998 fault clearing with
two islands.
1) Analysis With Two Islands: The applied fault was con-
sidered as cleared through a trip of both circuits of the EWI so
that the grid system split into two islands, namely the East zone
and the West zone. It should be noted that this case with two
islands was what actually happened after the occurrence of the
blackout. However, several attempts to achieve stability in each
of the two islands with various combinations of generation shed-
ding in the East zone (having a surplus prefault generation) and
load shedding in the West zone (having a deficit prefault gen-
eration) failed. This instability may be seen from the machine
swings shown in Figs. 3 and 4. The reason behind the failure
with two islands is that while an attempt for a simple balance
between “generation” and “load plus losses” may be effective
under steady-state condition, it is not applicable for a system
triggered into islanded conditions under a transient stability sit-
uation. In this condition, each island is subjected to different de-
grees of swings in bus voltages, line flows, and relative rotor an-
gles of the machines. This may be mitigated through further is-
landing together with generation /load shedding in suitable pro-
portion depending upon the prefault condition, fault location,
and severity.
2) Analysis With Five Islands: The same fault was reana-
lyzed considering it as cleared through a trip of both the cir-
cuits of the EWI and removal of each circuit of all the lines be-
tween the five geographical sections mentioned in Table I. So
in the after- fault condition, the grid was split into five islands.
Bringing each of the islands individually to stable conditions
required active (megawatt) generation and/or load shedding in
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Fig. 4. Swings of some machines in island-2 (comprised by the West zone)
relative to KHLNBMPP machine for the case of fault clearing with two islands.
Fig. 5. Oscillations of some machines in island-1 relative to RAUJ1210
machine for the case of fault clearing with five islands.
various proportions. The percentage of “served load” to “gener-
ation” became approximately 99% in island –1, 89% in island
– 2, and 98% in island – 3, all of which had surplus generation
prior to the fault as may be seen in Table I. This percentage be-
came approximately 64% in island – 4 and 59% in island – 5
each of which had a generation deficit.
The proportion of reactive volt ampere reactive (VAR) load
and generation does not influence the transient stability directly.
But to keep the bus voltage profiles within an acceptable range,
for a brief period in an emergency situation, some VAR gener-
ation and/or load shedding may become necessary. Otherwise,
voltage instability (i.e., voltage collapse), may occur which will
affect power transferability from the machines. The present
analysis showed that stability required MVAR generation
and/or MVAR load shedding in some of the five islands so that
the percentage of “served MVAR load” to “MVAR generation”
became approximately 50% in island – 1, 59% in island – 2,
57% in island – 3, 47% in island – 4, and 71% in island – 5.
The rotor swing angles and frequencies of some of the ma-
chines, and the voltage profiles at some of the buses in islands
–1 to 5 are shown in Figs. 5–12.
Fig. 6. Oscillations of some machines in island-2 relative to FENCGT-1
machine for fault clearing with five islands.
Fig. 7. Oscillations of some machines in island-3 relative to ASHU4150
machine for fault clearing with five islands.
Fig. 8. Frequency of some machines in island-3.
C. Implementation of Islanding
The number of intersection lines among the five prespecified
sections (mentioned in Table I) of the BPDB system is five. It is
being proposed that these intersection lines be monitored con-
stantly in real time by installing microprocessors at the substa-
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Fig. 9. Oscillations of some machines in island-4 relative to KHLNBMPP
machine for fault clearing with five islands.
Fig. 10. Voltage at the bus BHER—13 in island 4.
Fig. 11. Oscillations of some machines in island-5 relative to RANGX20
machine for the case of fault clearing with five islands.
tions at both ends of the respective lines. These microprocessors
will record the megawatt (active-power) flow in each line at a
convenient sampling rate [13] e.g., 1 kHz. If the difference be-
tween the recorded flow values for two consecutive instants of
time and exceeds a threshold at both ends of an intersection
line, then this line will be tripped for islanding the system. This
Fig. 12. Voltage at some of the buses in island-5.
Fig. 13. Real power (megawatt) flows in some of the transmission lines in the
East zone before clearing the fault of June 20, 1998.
approach is used because exceeding the set threshold value can
be considered as a possibility of a fault occurrence that requires
such islanding. However, to make sure that the changes in line
megawatt flow do not correspond to a transient disturbance, the
microprocessor will provide the decision on line tripping after
a delay for a suitable interval of time. Since the stability anal-
ysis for the crucial fault (blackout) has revealed that clearing a
fault through islanding in 0.08 s (i.e., four cycles) can prevent
a blackout in the BPDB system, the delay time can be set as
1.5 cycles (i.e., 0.03 s) so that the remaining 0.05 s (i.e., 2.5 cy-
cles) will be enough for the operation of the line breakers in the
BPDB system.
To propose a threshold percentage appropriate for the BPDB
system, the present work has determined the line active-power
(megawatt) flows in the lines existing between five sections of
the BPDB system under the blackout case. In addition to this,
five more assumed fault cases have also been studied separately
in a similar manner. Each of the assumed fault cases is consid-
ered as occurring on an internal line of the corresponding sec-
tion under the same prefault scenario (i.e., the peak operating
condition existing at 19:00 h of June 20, 1998). As representa-
tive cases, the megawatt flows in the five intersection lines for
a time span from to 0.08 s for the blackout and one of
the assumed five fault cases have been shown in Figs. 13–16.
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Fig. 14. Real-power (megawatt) flows in some of the transmission lines in the
West zone before clearing the fault of 20th June 1998.
Fig. 15. Real-power (megawatt) flows in some of the transmission lines in the
East zone before clearing a fault assumed in one circuit of the line FENPS-13
to SYLH-13.
Fig. 16. Real-power (megawatt) flows in some of the transmission lines in the
West zone before clearing a fault assumed in one circuit of the line FENPS-13
to SYLH-13.
An inspection of all such profiles for all of the intersection lines
between two instants and s have revealed that
the threshold may be set as 15%.
The number of islands to be formed for a fault will depend
upon the number of intersection lines in which the change in line
flow between two sampling instants exceeds the set threshold.
It should be noted that if for a fault case the active-power flow
changes in all the specified five intersection lines are 15% or
less, then the system will not be islanded for that fault case. So
upon implementing the proposed scheme, a fault occurring in
the BPDB system will result in two to five islands or none.
It is noteworthy that an alternative to islanding is keeping
the system intact where possible and resorting to load/genera-
tion shedding. Studies on this alternative option have also been
made for each of the five assumed fault cases. These studies have
revealed that mere load/generation shedding without islanding
cannot avert blackout in the BPDB system for any fault case that
causes more than 15% change in megawatt flow in an intersec-
tion line between two sampling instants.
D. Implementation of Load and Generation Switching to
Supplement Islanding
There are two points to be considered: 1) how much gener-
ation shed and/or load shed/injection is needed and 2) how to
realize these sheds or injections immediately after fault clearing
through islanding. It is being proposed that to determine the
amount and location of generation shed and load switching,
transient stability studies can be made by the National Control
Center. These studies will be performed in advance as part of se-
curity analysis [14] for different cases and faults in the system,
each with various numbers of islands under the same peak op-
erating condition. The results obtained can be transferred to the
computers of each area (section) control center. As soon as the
grid system is islanded, the area control center will transmit sig-
nals to respective grid substations and generating unit control
rooms to shed or inject load and/or decrease generation in pro-
portions near the values already obtained from security analysis.
It should be noted that the decisions on load/generation shed or
injection corresponding to peak-hours’ operating condition usu-
ally act as guidelines for offpeak hours’ operating conditions
when the system is less constrained.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed an islanding scheme to avert a
blackout in real time after a fault occurs. This has been tested
through comprehensive simulations on a practical and vulner-
able power system, namely the BPDB system. The following
are the main conclusions of the work presented here.
i) Whether any fault warrants islanding the BPDB system
can be decided through real-time digital monitoring
of the megawatt flows in each of the lines between a
number of prespecified sections. An intersection line
will be tripped due to a fault if the megawatt flow
changes between two successive sampling instants by
more than a threshold percentage at both ends of the
line or else it will remain intact. This will result in
splitting the system into two or more islands or none at
all depending upon the severity and location of the fault.
ii) The threshold percentage for the BPDB system has
been proposed as 15% through comprehensive studies
on the intersection line flows for the blackout of June
20, 1998 and five more assumed fault cases under the
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same prefault and peak operating condition. However,
this threshold can always be reviewed from time to
time when there are changes in the system topology and
generation/demand growth. Moreover, in the course of
time, if wide differences between the peak and offpeak
operating conditions of the system arise, a separate
threshold may also be contemplated for faults occurring
during offpeak hours.
iii) It has been observed from the extensive simulation
studies on the BPDB system that for those faults that
have contributed to more than 15% changes (between
two consecutive sampling instants) in the megawatt flow
of any intersection line, a blackout cannot be averted by
only load/generation shedding while keeping the system
fully connected (i.e., no islanding).
iv) Alongside islanding, there is a need for shedding some
megawatt/mega volt ampere reactive (MVAR) genera-
tion and/or load at various locations to maintain the sta-
bility of the synchronous machines operating in the re-
spective islands. It is proposed that the guidelines in de-
termining the amounts and locations of generation shed-
ding and load switching in each island be obtained from
an array of transient stability studies, made as part of the
security analysis.
The underlying philosophy of the proposed scheme of is-
landing may also be implemented in other power systems using
existing hierarchies of computerized control.
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